

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 19711 01 OF 02 241659Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----097277 241720Z /42  
O 241648Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3060  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 19711

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR PB  
ZZWKT  
/)  
JQBGLNYYRFG CIJHRTECMGHQZSH #  
PRAVID CONSULTATIONS WITH EGYPTIANS  
REF: (A) CAIRO 19608, (B) STATE 213798

SUMMARY: KAMEL, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM LEAVE, AGREED THAT UNRESOLVED WEST BANK/GAZA/PALESTINIAN PROBLEMS SHOULD BE PRIME FOCUS OF CAMP DAVID TALKS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT BEGIN HARDLINE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND HE REJECTED BEGIN'S IDEA OF PERMANENT PARTIAL SETTLEMENTS. HE HOPED TRILATERAL HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS WILL BE KEPT TO MINIMUM LEST SADAT OVERCOMMIT HIMSELF AT SUCH MEETINGS AND FURTHER ISOLATE AND EMBARRASS GOE IN ARAB EYES. EGYPTIANS, ACCORDING TO KAMEL, WILL STAND BY THEIR WEST BANK/GAZA PROPOSAL MADE AT LEEDS CASTLE CONFERENCE. BEGINNING SATURDAY, THEY INTEND REVIEW OLD POSITION PAPERS, BUT KAMEL THOUGHT LITTLE UPDATING NEEDED EXCEPT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AND RESPOND TO RECENT UNACCEPTABLE BEGIN PUBLIC STATEMENTS. KAMEL ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT WE MAY BE THINKING ABOUT STATEMENT ALONG LINES OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIQUE, WHICH IN PRESENT FORM IS UNACCEPTABLE TO GOE. FINALLY,  
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IN LIGHT PRESIDENT CARTER'S "U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT" INTERVIEW, HE WAS WORRIED THAT WE MIGHT BE THINKING OF SOMETHING ALONG LINES OF OUR AUGUST 1977 PAPER. SOME OF THE POINTS IN THIS, HE NOTED, TROUBLE GOE. KAMEL EMPHASIZED GOE POSITION REMAINS THAT ANY BORDER RECTIFICATIONS SHOULD BE ONLY ON WEST BANK AND BE MINOR IN NATURE. WILL TRY TO PROBE SADAT DURING OUR MEETING SATURDAY NIGHT,

BUT KAMEL AND MFA ADVISERS SHOW NO SIGNS OF ANY GIVE.  
END SUMMARY.

1. MET WITH FONMIN KAMEL TODAY TO OUTLINE TO HIM  
CURRENT STATE OF OUR THINKING ON CAMP DAVID MEETING AND  
TO PROBE PERTINENT EGYPTIAN IDEAS. HE HAD JUST RETURNED  
FROM A WEEK OF LEAVE AND HAD NOT YET SEEN SADAT. HE HAD,  
HOWEVER, TALKED TO VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK BY PHONE AND  
HOPES TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT NEXT WEEK.

2. AFTER I HAD FINISHED GIVING HIM OUR IDEAS BASED ON  
REF B, KAMEL AGREED THAT WEST BANK/GAZA/PALESTINIAN SET  
OF PROBLEMS SHOULD BE THE PRIME FOCUS OF THE CAMP DAVID  
MEETING. HE EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE HARDLINE  
STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE COME OUT OF ISRAEL THIS PAST WEEK,  
CONTENDING PRIMIN BEGIN SEEMS NOT TO HAVE HEEDED OUR  
ENJOINER TO REDUCE UNHELPFUL RHETORIC. HE MADE A POINT  
OF DRAWING MY ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT GOE HAS ABIDED  
BY OUR SUGGESTIONS, BUT SAID IT IS NOT EASY IN THE FACE  
OF THE CONSTANT PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS MADE BY BEGIN.

3. VOICING HIS PERSONAL VIEWS, KAMEL SAID ISRAELI SUGGES-  
TIONS THAT SINAI MATTERS BE DISCUSSED ARE UNACCEPTABLE.  
NOR IS BEGIN'S IDEA OF PERMANENT PARTIAL SETTLEMENTS  
ACCEPTABLE. SADAT HAD MADE THIS CLEAR PUBLICLY AND HE,  
KAMEL, WISHED TO REITERATE IT SO THAT THERE IS NO MIS-  
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UNDERSTANDING. I SAID THAT WE KNEW THE EGYPTIAN POSITION  
ABOUT PARTIAL SETTLEMENTS AND, AS I HAD JUST TOLD HIM,  
BELIEVE THE FOCUS OF THE MEETING SHOULD BE ON UNRESOLVED  
WEST BANK/GAZA AND PALESTINIAN MATTERS. IF, HOWEVER, THE  
ISRAELIS SHOULD RAISE SINAI MATTERS, WHICH THEY ARE  
LIKELY TO DO, I HOPED THAT EGYPTIAN SIDE WOULD BE PRE-  
PARED TO DISCUSS THEM. KAMEL SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO  
THIS, BUT ANY ISRAELI EFFORT TO SHIFT THE PRINCIPAL  
FOCUS OF TALKS FROM WEST BANK/GAZA/PALESTINIAN MATTERS TO  
SINAI WILL BE OPPOSED BY EGYPTIAN DELEGATION.

4. KAMEL REVERTED TO A FAMILIAR THEME. HE THOUGHT THAT  
THE IDEA OF AN INITIAL SET OF BILATERALS BETWEEN PRESI-  
DENT CARTER AND EACH OF THE TWO PRINCIPALS IS GOOD. HE  
ALSO AGREED THAT THE AGENDA SHOULD BE AS UNSTRUCTURED AS  
POSSIBLE. HE REITERATED HIS HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE  
WILL BE A MINIMUM OF TRILATERAL HEADS OF GOVERNMENT  
MEETINGS. HE FRANKLY EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT SADAT  
MAY AT SUCH MEETINGS OVERCOMMIT HIMSELF AND IN THE PRO-  
CESS ISOLATE AND EMBARRASS GOE FURTHER IN ARAB EYES. HE  
HOPED MOST MEETINGS WOULD BE AT THE DELEGATION LEVEL,  
EVEN IF THE LATTER HAS TO BE RESTRICTED.

5. ASKED ABOUT EGYPTIAN POSITIONS, KAMEL AFFIRMED THAT GOE WILL STAND BY THE WEST BANK/GAZA PROPOSAL WHICH IT MADE AT LEEDS CASTLE CONFERENCE. IN GOE'S VIEW, THIS IS A FAIR PROPOSAL AND SHOULD MEET ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS. SECURITY AND OTHER MATTERS CAN BE ADEQUATELY WORKED OUT AND THERE MAY BE INOVATIVE IDEAS ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT SUCH A PROPOSAL. GOE, HE ADMITTED, HAS NOT AS YET DONE ANY SERIOUS PAPERWORK FOR THE MEETING. MFA STAFF HAS DUSTED OFF PREVIOUS POSITION PAPERS AND, BEGINNING SATURDAY, IT WILL WORK HARD TO UPDATE THEM. HIS PRELIMINARY IMPRESSION WAS THAT RELATIVELY LITTLE UPDATING IS

NOTE BY OC/T: SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 19711; #FIRST PORTION OF  
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TEXT AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----097617 241752Z /42  
O 241648Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3061  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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NEEDED, EXCEPT PERHAPS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AND RESPOND TO RECENT BEGIN PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO EGYPT.

6. KAMEL THEN VOICED TWO CONCERNS:

(A) FIRST, KAMEL NOTED THAT KRIESKY HAD MADE A STATEMENT AFTER ANNOUNCEMENT OF CAMP DAVID THAT HE UNDERSTANDS

SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL PAPER MIGHT COME OUT OF THE MEETING. KAMEL SAID HE WISHED TO CLARIFY WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN A MISUNDERSTANDING. SADAT HAD INDEED SPOKEN TO PERES, KRIESKY AND BRANDT IN VIENNA ON THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF STATEMENT, BUT SADAT HAD NOT SEEN THE FINAL TEXT, NOR HAD HE APPROVED IT. WHEN SADAT SAW WHAT CAME OUT, THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN EXTREMELY UNHAPPY, ESPECIALLY WITH THE PHRASEOLOGY ABOUT WITHDRAWAL TO BORDERS AGREED UPON THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AND ISRAELI SECURITY MEASURES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY. (HE DID NOT HAVE THE EXACT TEXT BEFORE HIM.) HE, KAMEL, HAD ON SADAT'S INSTRUCTIONS MADE A STATEMENT ON THE SECOND DAY AFTER THIS STATEMENT WAS ISSUED TO CLARIFY THE EGYPTIAN POSITION. HE HOPED THAT WE ARE NOT UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT, IN ITS PRESENT FORM, IS IN ANY WAY ACCEPTABLE TO GOE.

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(B) SECOND, KAMEL REFERRED TO THE CLARIFICATION THAT WE HAD PROVIDED ON WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD IN MIND IN HIS "U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT" INTERVIEW. KAMEL HAD CHECKED THE FIVE POINTS PRESENTED IN AUGUST 1977 AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE FIRST SENTENCE OF POINT 4 IS VERY SIMILAR TO THAT USED IN THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT. SO FAR AS EGYPT IS CONCERNED, SUCH LANGUAGE, IF READ LITERALLY, IS UNACCEPTABLE. GOE, HE STATED, IS NOT GOING TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL ON EITHER THE EGYPTIAN OR SYRIAN BORDERS. THESE ARE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS. SO FAR AS THE WEST BANK IS CONCERNED, EGYPT'S POSITION REMAINS THAT MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS ARE POSSIBLE, BUT NO TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS SUCH AS THE ISRAELIS ARE DEMANDING. KAMEL NOTED THAT SADAT HAS RECENTLY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH KING HUSSEIN AND CLAIMED THAT HUSSEIN IS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT ANY WEST BANK BORDER RECTIFICATIONS MUST BE MINOR IN NATURE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SAUDIS ARE ALSO IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT. KAMEL ARGUED THAT SADAT HAS MADE ALL THE CONCESSIONS THAT HE CAN, AND ESPECIALLY MENTIONED NORMALIZATION, AND THAT GOE SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED GIVE ANY MORE. I ARGUED FOR MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY ON PART BOTH PARTIES.

7. WE AGREED TO BE IN TOUCH ON SATURDAY PRIOR TO MY MEETING WITH SADAT LATE THAT EVENING IN ISMAILIA.

8. COMMENT: THERE IS NO SIGN TO DATE THAT THE EGYPTIANS-- AT LEAST AT THE KAMEL AND MFA LEVEL--ARE PREPARED TO MODIFY THEIR POSITIONS. IF ANYTHING, THE RECENT SPATE OF BEGIN PUBLIC STATEMENTS IS MAKING THEM DIG IN STILL MORE. SADAT MAY, AND USUALLY DOES, HAVE HIS OWN IDEAS, WHICH I

WILL TRY TO PROBE WHEN I MEET WITH HIM ON SATURDAY NIGHT.

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IF HIS ADVISERS HAVE THEIR WAY, HOWEVER, THERE WILL NOT  
BE A GREAT DEAL OF GIVE, IF ANY, IN THE EGYPTIAN  
POSITION. EILTS

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## Message Attributes

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**Draft Date:** 24 aug 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS, EXDIS  
**Reference:** 78 CAIRO 19608, 78 STATE 213798, 78 STATE 213978  
**Retention:** 0  
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**Review Content Flags:** ANOMALY  
**Review Date:** 17 jun 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
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**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014